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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 14313

-vsROBERT C. DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with burglary, a violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 (1975), and theft, a
violation of Utah Code Annotated, § 76-7-404 (1975).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted by a jury of the crimes
of Burglary and Theft on October 2, 1975, before Honorable
Peter F. Leary, in the Third District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

Appellant was sentenced

to serve one to fifteen years and zero to one years
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as provided by the law.

The sentences are to run

concurrently with each other and with others he is
presently serving.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction
of appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the afternoon of July 21, 1975# Deputy
Shefiff Mike Hanks was holding surveillance on an
apartment in Salt Lake City, Utah.

From his position

he observed appellant and Thayne Walker leave the
apartment.

Hanks then lost sight of the two when

they went around a building (T-37).

Hanks then got in

his patrol car hoping to relocate the pair.

About ten

to twelve minutes later he again observed the two in a
volkswagon van, driven by Walker, in the driveway of
another apartment building (T-37).

Hanks drove past

the driveway and waved to appellant who he knew.
Appellant waved back (T-7).

Hanks then pulled over to

allow the van to pass but instead it pulled up behind
his patrol car (T-38).
Appellant jumped out of the van and walked
quickly towards the patrol car as Hands got out (Suppres
7, 8). During a brief conversation appellant stated
he had been visiting a friend in the apartment (T-8).
Hanks asked Walker for his driver's license and Walker
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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removed it from his shoe (Supp. hearing p. 9). Hanks
determined that the license was valid and then asked
Walker if he had recently been arrested in Price,
knowing already that he had been (Supp. hearing p. 10).
Walker initially denied the arrest but then admitted
it when he found that Hanks already knew (Supp* hearing
p. 11). About this time Deputy Hanks observed stereo
equipment in the back of the van (T-39).

When appellant

noticed that Hanks saw the equipment, he stated that
he didn't know anything about any stereo equipement
(T-37,60).

This was a totally unsolicited remark by the

appellant.

Deputy Hanks then went to his car and radioed

for an additional officer.

When Officer Crockett

arrived Hanks told him to watch the two while he checked
the nearby apartments where the pair had come from
(T-4 0).

Deputy Hanks very shortly discovered an apart-

ment with a door open.

Splinters of wood were laying

about and pry marks were visible on the door (T-4 2).
On looking inside the apartment, Hanks observed pictures

In all fairness to appellant, it should be noted
that at the suppression hearing Officer Hanks testified
that he called for additional help prior to the time
when he noticed the stereo equipment. This point was
not developed through cross-examination by appellant. Of
course, during the suppression hearing Officer Hanks may
have become confused since he testified of two separate calls
over his radio, the first for validation of Walker's driver's
license and the second for another officer to come.
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and lamps lying about as if the place had been ransacked
(T-42).
Deputy Hanks then returned to the van and placed
appellant and Walker under arrest (T-63).

After obtaining

a search warrant for the van, Hanks recovered stereo
equipment, a piggy bank, and other items from the
burgalized apartment (T-43).

Still later, pursuant to

another search warrant, Hanks obtained two 1972
Eisenhower Silver Dollars from appellantfs personal
effects at the jail.

The dollars were from the apart-

ment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
OFFICER HANKS'INVESTIGATION OF APPELLANT WAS
ENTIRELY REASONABLE AND CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE.
Appellant was convicted of burglary and theft
for breaking into an apartment in Salt Lake City, Utah
(T-212).

Appellant does not allege or appeal that a

burglary was not committed or that the evidence at
trail was insufficient as to him being the perpetrator.
Instead, he seeks reversal of his conviction solely
on the basis that it resulted from the use of evidence
which was allegedly obtained during an illegal detention
by a police officer.
Respondent submits that the Officer's brief
detention of appellant was

reasonable and permissible

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
under theDigitized
circumstances.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Before examining the facts it is important
to note that appellant
suppression hearing.

raised this same issue at a
The Honorable Peter Leary

determined, after examining all evidence, that the
peace officer acted properly.

It is well established

in Utah that the findings of the trial court are
presumed to be correct and that the ruling will not
be disturbed unless it clearly appears that there was
error.

State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d

517 (1968), reaffirmed in State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d
269, 508 P.2d 534, 536 (1973).

Respondent submits that

there was no error at all, let alone a "clear" error.
There are three basic areas of interaction
between private citizens and the police.

These may

be referred to as (a) casual interaction, (b) stops
or momentary detentions and (c) formal or complete
arrest.

It is important to note the differences of the

three areas in two aspects, (1) the amount of force exerted
by the police, and (2) the circumstances which authorize
that use of force.
a.

Casual interaction

Casual interaction is a situation where no force
is exerted by the officer.

The citizen is free to end

the encounter at all times.

-5-

Since no rights are infringed
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the officer need not show any basis at all for the
interaction.

Examples include situations in which

officers meet acquaintances on the street and make
small talk, or where an officer asks a person, "have
you heard. • . .", "do you know anything about. . . / ,
or

"What is going on."

In Terry v. Ohio, 3 92

U.S. 1 20 L.Ed2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), the
Supreme Court of the United States recognized this
type of interaction:
"Obviously, not all personal
intercourse between police and citizens
involves 'seizures of persons.1 Only
when the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority has in
some way restrained the liberty of
a citizen may we conclude that a
'seizure1 has occured." 20 L.ed2d
at 905, fn. 16.
Obviously, this type of interaction can be initiated
by either the police or the citizen such as when a
man comes up to a policeman and voluntarily begins
a conversation.
b.

Stops or Momentary Detentions

This involves the typical "stop" or "stop
and frisk" situation where an officer briefly stops
an individual to get information from him concerning
his actions.

Here the individual is not free to leave.

In other words, physical force or a show of authority
is involved.

Because of this, such a situation is

impermissible unless the officer has a reasonable and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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good faith belief, based upon articulable facts, that
his actions are warranted.

See Terry v. Ohio, supra.

Thus, Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-33 (1975), provides:
"A peace officer may stop any
person in a public place whom he
has probable cause to believe:
1) is in the act of committing
a crime;
2) has committed a crime; or
3) is attempting to commit a
crime;
and may demand of him his name,
address and an explanation of his
actions.
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court holds:
"A brief stop of a suspicious
individual, in order to determine
his identity or to maintain the
status quo momentarily while obtaining
more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to
the officer at the time. Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 32 L.ed2d 612
92 S.Ct. 1921 (1972).
See also State v. Torres, Utah, supra.

Obviously, in

the "stop" situation the officer need not have the
extensive probable cause required to make an arrest.
Rather, the brief detention is an "intermediate response"
so that "a policeman who lacks. . • probable cause to
arrest [need not] shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur or a criminal to escape."

Adams v.

Williams, supra.
c.

Complete arrest.

In this situation, the officer uses sufficient
force to entirely curtail the liberty of the person
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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arrested.

This greater use of authority must be based

on stronger or more incriminating circumstances than
would authorize the "stop" or brief detention.

The

term generally used for the authorization to arrest
is "probable cause"; derived from the Fourth Amendment
of the Constitution.

Henry v. United States, 3 61 U.S.

98,"4 L.Ed2d 134, 80 S.Ct. 168 (1959).

However, other

terms have been used to connote the same thing.

Thus,

some statutes and judicial decisions use such terms
as "reasonable cause," "reasonable ground," "reasonable
belief", or "sufficient cause."

All such terms are

ordinarily intended to mean "probable cause" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Draper v. United

States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L.Ed2d 327, 79 S.Ct. 329 (1959).
In describing the three major types of policecitizen interaction it should be noted that they are

2

.

Appellant would have this court engage m
a dispute based on semantics. He points out that the
Utah statute authorizing a stop and frisk, section 77-13-33,
requires "probable cause" while the arrest statute, section
77-13-3, requests only "reasonable cause." Appellant
suggests that the legislature intended a detention to
be prohibited except on more highly incriminating
circumstances than required for an arrest. Respondent
submits that appellant's position is entirely illogical
and contrary to the best interests of the public. Furthermore, the intent of the legislature in enacting the detention statute is made manifest by the very title of the
act: "An act providing a peace officer with authority
to detain a suspect temporarily for questioning and
search him for dangerous weapons where good cause appears."
See Laws of Utah 1967, Chap. 203, p. 559Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

all part of a sliding scale.

That is, all detentions

and arrests involve varying degrees of force - the
amount of force dependant on the circumstances.

For

this reason, the United States Supreme Court has
fashioned the rule that in justifying any intrusion,
the officer must point to facts which, taken together
with rational inferences, reasonably warrant that
particular intrusion,

Terry v. Ohio, supra.

Obviously, one incident between an officer
and an individual may involve all three of the above
catagories.

For example, an officer may initiate

a conversation and the individual begins to act
suspiciously.

The officer may then detain the

individual forcefully to get further information.
If that information is incriminating, the officer may
then effect an arrest.
Respondent submits that the present case is
an example of just such a situation*

The inter-

action between Officer Hanks and appellant began with
absolutely no force involved on the officer's part
and complete liberty to leave on appellant's part.
However, appellant acted suspiciously and gave the
officer cause to detain him briefly while more information was gathered.

Finally, with full probable

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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cause, appellant was arrested for the crime of which
he now stands convicted.
The record indicates that the officer had
appellant under surveillance and lost sight of
him for a few minutes.

Thereafter, Officer Hanks

saw appellant in the driveway of an apartment complex (T-37).

Officer Hanks had previously arrested

appellant for the exact same crime, i.e. stealing
stereo equipment from an apartment (Supp. hearing
p. 14). Officer Hanks pulled over to the side of
the road and appellant, voluntarily pulled up behind him (T-38).

There was absolutely no force or

authority involved.

There was no siren, flashing

lights, or even a motion by the officer to pull
over.

The action was completely voluntary on the

part of appellant.

After pulling over, appellant

approached the police car walking rapidly as if
he didn't want the officer to walk back to the
van (Supp. hearing p* 8 ) . Again, appellant,
instead of waiting in his van to see what the officer
wanted, voluntarily initiated further interaction.
After some conversation the officer asked appellant
what he was doing.

Appellant said he had been

visiting a friend.

Appellant did not know that the

officer had had him under surveillance for quite a
while.

However, the officer knew that either appellant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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was telling the truth and it had been a very short
visit, or else appellant had been doing something
else at those apartments that takes only a very short
time.

The officer.then asked the co-defendant

for some identification and the co-defendant pulled
his driver's license out of his sock (Supp. hearing
p. 9). The officer then asked the co-defendant whether
he had recently been arrested in Price, knowing
already that he had been.

The co-defendant lied and

said he had not, but thereafter admitted the arrest
when he realized he had been caught in a lie (Supp*
hearing p. 11). Finally, while talking with appellant,
the Officer noticed stereo equipment in the back
of the van.

Appellant, realizing that the Officer had

observed the stereo components, immediately volunteered
the remark that the didn't know anything about
anything in the van (T-37,60).

This was not in

answer to any question but was totally unsolicited.
In light of all of these circumstances and
the additional fact that Officer Hanks was a highly
experienced police officer, he clearly had good cause
to have back up officers detain appellant for another
brief moment while he made a quick check on the
nearby apartment from which appellant had just come.
Using the words of the Utah State Supreme Court,
Officer Hanks was maintaining the status quo momenDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tarily while obtaining more information.

Respondent

submits that the Officer's actions were constitutionally
permissible and highly reasonable in light of the
facts in his possession.

As the United State Supreme

Court said:
"The Fourth Amendment does not
require a policeman who lacks the
precise level of information necessary
for probable cause to arrest to simply
shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur or a criminal to
escape. On the contrary, Terry
recognizes that it may be the
essence of good police work to
adopt an intermediate response
' • • • • " Adams v. Williams, supra.
Respondent further submits that this case is
controlled by the case of State v. Torres, supra.

In

that case, a police officer stopped a car with two
men in it for no other reason that it was in the
i •'

vicinity of a crime scene.
committed by one man.

The crime had only been

Nevertheless, the conviction

of one of the men in the car was upheld.

The police

officer in the Torres case had much less reason to
stop Torres, than Officer Hanks to detain appellant.
Utah Supreme Court held:
". . . it is essential that a
reasonable degree of tolerance be
indulged as to the judgment of
police officers, so long as they
are acting in good faith and within
the standards of decent and decorous
behavior." 508 P.2d at 536.
Furthermore:
" . . . justifiable suspicion
of a police officer affords a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The

proper constitutional basis for
stopping a person and momentarily
restraining the person's freedom
"
•

•

•

•

id
-LH •

Respondent submits that appellantfs conviction should
be affirmed.
POINT II
OFFICER HANKS HAD AMPLE PROBABLE CAUSE TO
ARREST THE DEFENDANT AS REQUIRED BY THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
The Fourth Amendment protections of the
United

States Constitution originated to guard

against highhanded and ruthless intrusions against
persons, homes and property by officials of an
oppressive government.

Article I, Section 14 of the

Constitution of the State of Utah is nearly identical
to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution in its language protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures:

both require probable

cause as discussed, supra, in Point I.
The United States Supreme Court defined
probable cause in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 69 L.Ed.2d 543, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925):
"This is to say that the facts
and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient
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in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief
that intoxicating liquor was
being transported in the automobile which they stopped and
searched." 267 U.S. at 162.
The problem suggested by Carroll is that
at some point in the factual chain, mere suspicion
evolves into probable cause, and it is at that
3
point that an arrest can be made legally.
The
Court discussed at length how to determine when
probable cause exists:
"That line necessarily must be
drawn by an act of judgment formed
in the light of the particular situation and with account take of
all circumstances. 338 U.S. at
17 6. In dealing with probable
cause, however, as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly
correlative to what must be
proved." 338 U.S. at 175.
The Court in Brinegar recognized that the
proof of probable cause is not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, because so strict a standard would
render much law enforcement ineffective.
In

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160
93 L.Ed.2d 1879, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949).

-14-
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The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
this standard in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
43 L.Ed.2d 54, 95 S.Ct. 854, on remand 511 F.2d
528:
"The standard for arrest is
probable cause, defined in terms of
facts and circumstances 'sufficient
to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the [suspect] had committed
or was committing an offense.1 .
This standard, like those for searches
and seizures, represents a necessary
accomodation between the individual's
right to liberty and the State's duty
to control crime. Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. at 111, 112.
Utah is also sensitive to the balancing
interests of Fourth Amendment protections and reasonable effective law enforcement:
"No right-thinking person would
desire to minimize or disparage the
protections thus assured. But it
is equally important that such
protections be applied in circumstances they were intended to cover
and that they do not become so
extended beyond their reasons for
being that even where there is no
danger or liklihood of any such
abuse, they provide a cloak of
protection by which those engaged in
criminal activities may escape detection and punishment. The essential
thing is to keep within the reasonable
middle ground, between the protecting
of the lawabiding citizenry from highhanded and officious intrusions
into their private affairs; and the
imposing of undue restrictions upon
conscientious officers doing their
duty in the investigation of crime,"
State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272,
274, 275, 444 P.2d 517, 518, 519 (1968).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

As a practical matter, Deputy Hanks1 ten
years of experience as deputy sheriff should be
taken into consideration in determining the existence
of probable cause.

Not only did he have ten years

of experience on the force; but at the time of the
arrest he was a detective in the special tactical
division (T-36); and he has estimated he was involved in about 100 arrests and investigations of this
of this kind (T-52).

Such experience made him

sensitive to observable suspicious activity.
Terry v. Ohio, supra, includes the officer's experience to aid in determining whether his search
was reasonable.
Although Deputy Hanks did not have probable
cause to arrest the appellant and Walker while at
the van as discussed supra, in Point I, he did
have probable cause to detain them briefly.

At

that point Hanks went to the nearby apartment complex to investigate.

There he discovered a door to

an apartment open about a footand a half, splintered
and broken wood about the door, and the door exhibited
pry marks on it about a half inch wide.

He looked

inside and observed a lamp overtruned and the apartment in apparent disarray.

With this information and

in light of the facts he already knew:
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(1)

appellant had a previous arrest and

conviction of burglary of an apartment;
(2)

Walker had a previous arrest;

(3)

appellant and Walker had been out of

his view for about twelve minutes;
(4)

the van had pulled out of an apartment

(5)

Walker had pulled the van over to the

complex;

curb without being ordered to do so;
(6)

appellant got out of the van and walked

quickly to Hanks 1 car;
(7)

Walker pulled his driver's license out

of his sock;
(8)

there was stereo equipment in the back

of the van; and
(9)

after Hanks saw the equipment, appellant

stated he knew nothing about it - an unsolicited
statement.
Deputy Hanks had more than sufficient probable cause
to arrest and his actions were proper and in accordance
with Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-3 (Supp. 1971);
"A peace officer may make an
arrest in obedience to a warrant
delivered to him; or may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(4) When a felony has in fact
been committed, and he has reasonable
cause for believing the person
arrested to have committed it.,f
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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f

In fact, Deputy Hanks had more facts before him
I
than did the police in State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah
2d'124, 499 P.2d 276 .(1972).

In that case a Nephi

police officer observed car lights flash on and a
car drive away from a medical clinic parking lot at
3:00 a.m.

He stopped the car and questioned its

occupants - three teenage boys - none of whom he
apparently knew personally or knew had any police
record, then allowed them to proceed . The officer
then went to the clinic; while investigating, he
discovered a broken window and an unlocked door.
He radioed to other units to have the auto stopped
and the occupants arrested.

In Eastmond, this Court

held there was probable cause for the arrest*
It is important to note that prior to their
actual arrest the Nephi officer did not have any
more evidence that a crime actually had been committed
than did Deputy Hanks. Also, Eastmond goes further
than the case at bar because in Eastmond prior to
the request to arrest the defendants the Nephi officer
had not seen any suspicious items in the car, as
did Deputy Hanks.

In Eastmond it was only after the

occupants were arrested that the "doctor's bag" and
items items were observed.

-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant cites People v. Miller, 7 Ca. 3d
219, 496 P.2d 1228, 101 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1972) in
support of

his position, claiming that electronic

equipment seen in the back of Millerfs automobile was
not, in itself sufficient to support an inference that
it was contraband.

The police suspected a burglary

when they saw the electronic equipment in his back
seat, and they wanted to take custody of it.
refused and the police took it anyway.
discovered marijuana.

Defendant

They later

The holding in Miller was

that the police may not use a refusal to waive
Fourth Amendment rights into a "suspicious" activity
evidencing criminal conduct.

In Miller the officers

only knew that the defendant was asleep in his car
at a late hour, that he had equipment in the back of
his car and that he had an outstanding traffic warrant.
Unlike the case at bar, the police had no evidence
whatsoever of any offense even tenuously related to
Miller to suspect him of burglary, there was not any
evidence of a criminal background of burglary by
Miller and no suspicious behavior by Miller to avoid
detection of possible criminal conduct*
Appellant also cites Remers v. Superior Court
of Alameda County, 2 Cal. 3d 659, 470 P.2d 11, 87
Cal. Rptr. 202 (1970).

The distinguishing factor in

Remers was that the arresting officer had no knowledge
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

of the defendant's previous criminal record either
reliably or first-hand.

The Court in Remers was

primarily concerned with protecting against the
manufacture of criminal records to help get probable
cause.

This is not the case with the appellant's

arrest; here Deputy Hanks himself had previously
arrested the appellant on a burglary charge, so
this plus all of the other surrounding circumstances
clearly gave Hanks probable cause to arrest the
appellant*
There is no question that an arrest requires
probable cause, but just what constitutes probable
cause is subject to interpretation.

The United

States Supreme Court in Henry v. United States f supra,
held that the arresting officer did not have probable
cause to arrest the defendant where they:
(1)

did not know defendant;

(2)

did not have more than mere suspicion

regarding defendant's companion;
(3)

defendant had no previous criminal record; and

(4)

observed defendant engaging in totally

outwardly innocent activities (i.e. riding in a car,
stopping in an alley, picking up packages, and driving
away).
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In this case, Deputy Hanks knew of the appellant's
previous criminal activity, plus he observed suspicious
conduct by the two suspects, plus he had reasonable
grounds for believing an apartment had been broken
into, plus

he observed the stereo equipment in the

van, plus he received the unsolicited statement from
the appellant disclaiming knowledge about the stereo•
Taking the surrounding circumstances as a whole,
Carroll v. United States, supra, Deputy Hanks clearly
had probable cause for arresting the appellant and
Walker.
POINT III
IN LIGHT OF THE LAWFUL ARREST OF THE APPELLANT
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH THE TWO SEARCH WARRANTS
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE.
Respondent concedes the validity of the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine but contends that it
does not apply in this case.

The appellant's arrest

was lawful; therefore his Point III has no application.
Further, appellant does not question the structural
validity of the two search warrants, and since they
were issued properly and with probable cause, the
requirements of valid warrants have been met.
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It is only to Deputy Hanks' credit that he
obtained these warrants at all, because the searches
and seizures of the van and of appellantfs personal
effects while he was incarcerated would have been
valid even without warrants.

In Chambers v. Maroney,

399 U.S. 42, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 90 S.Ct. 1975, rehearing
denied 400 U.S. 856, 27 L.Ed.2d 94, 91 S.Ct. 23 (1970),
a warrantless search of an automobile after it was
taken to a police station was held constitutional
where (1) there was probable cause to arrest the
occupants of the automobile and to search the automobile for weapons and contraband, (2) an immediate
search of the automobile at the time and place of
the arrest would have been constitutionally permissible,
and (3)

it was not unreasonable to take the automobile

to the police station before making the search, and
probable cause for the search still existed after the
automobile was take to the police station.

Chambers

v. Maroney, supra.
The search for the two 1972 Eisenhower silver
dollars would also have been valid even without a search
warrant.

United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 39

L.Ed.2d 771, 94 S.Ct. 1234 (1974).

In Edwards, the

United States Supreme Court held a warrantless search
and seizure of the arrested suspectfs trousers and
shirt valid:
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" . . . once the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the
effects in his possession at the place
of detention that were subject to
search at the time and place of his
arrest may lawfully be searched and
seized without a warranty even though
a substantial period of time has
elapsed between the arrest and subsequent administrative processing,
on the one hand, and the taking of the
property for use as evidence, on the
other." United States v. Edwards, 415
U. S. at
CONCLUSION
The investigation conducted by Deputy Hanks
was entirely reasonable and based on the requisite
sufficient cause; and he had probable cause to arrest
the appellant after discovering the burglarized
apartment.

The evidence obtained was based on a

clearly legal arrest and was properly admitted into
evidence at trial.

The conviction of the appellant

should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL P. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent.
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